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Introduction
THE TORT of negligence is primarily concerned with the conduct of
individuals within society and seeks to act as a deterrent by modifying a
person's behaviour. However, within any society a conﬂict of interest(s) may
arise resulting in harm including physical injury. The law of tort has evolved
through case law, legislation and public policy, the last either by recognising
a duty of care exists or restricting such a duty to prescribed criteria. Public
policy has been an issue when dealing with claims in Britain against the
tobacco industry for smoking related illnesses. In America actions brought
against tobacco manufacturers have been successful. The Labour
Government has recognised the controversial issues involved in smoking
tobacco and is attempting to address the health problems. Tony Blair openly
acknowledges the dangers related to smoking in the preface to the White
Paper:1
In Britain today, more than 120,000 people are going to die over the
next year from illnesses directly related to smoking. And the year after
that, and the year after that. Unless we all do something. . . . [This] is a
testimony to individual and family suffering which need not happen.
This appalling waste of people's lives. . . . Smoking Kills (p. 1).
This is a damning statement against the tobacco industry and their products
and begs the question, "are manufacturers of tobacco products liable under
the tort of negligence?" The law of tort has deﬁned criteria to prove liability,
based upon a burden of proof on a balance of probability. For example, the
claimant must demonstrate he or she was owed a duty of care, breach of
duty and loss suffered as a consequence. To support such a claim in
negligence the claimant must adduce evidence to show the defendant was
aware of the risks involved, i.e., foreseeability, and as a result caused the
harm. To answer this question and fulﬁl the above criteria the author will
present scientiﬁc evidence carried out and give a comparison with the
American approach.
In 1950 Sir Richard Doll and Sir Austin Bradford Hill comprehensively
documented the history of the evidence and harm caused by the usage of
tobacco. This documentary evidence was examined by the Health Education
Authority (HEA), the statutory body which advises the Government on
health education issues, which claimed this documentation was available to
the tobacco industry in the United States and Britain. They believed the
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1 Smoking Kills, Cm 4177, 1998.
tobacco industry was well aware of the dangers associated with smoking and
chose to ignore and deny the dangers.2 This was supported by the Royal
College of Nursing (RCN)3 and Action On Smoking and Health (ASH),4
which submitted evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee:5
By 1950 it was clear that smoking was a likely cause of serious illness
and premature death—in the 1950s the link was established beyond
reasonable doubt. Since 1950 the range of diseases and magnitude of
risks have become better understood, so that it is now possible to
attribute over 50 medical conditions and 20 diseases causing premature
death to smoking. As knowledge has progressed, estimates of the
mortality and morbidity attributable to smoking have increased. (p. 1)
It may be argued that many consumers are now aware of the risks associated
with smoking tobacco products through the Government's warnings on the
packaging of cigarettes and advertisements. However, should this absolve the
tobacco industry or regulators from their responsibility and actions being
brought for negligence? Alternatively, it may be argued, liability is strict
under the Consumer Protection Act 1987, Part I, which exists alongside
liability in negligence. Under this legislation the consumer does not have to
prove negligence if it is deemed a manufacturer's product is defective and
the cigarette maker would not be able to avoid liability.6 However, the
claimant must still prove a causal link between the defect in the product and
his injuries.7 Furthermore, since the 1987 legislation came into force there
are no reported cases which deal speciﬁcally with Part I and product liability,
which makes it difﬁcult to evaluate the impact of this legislation8 although
ASH and RCN believe the tobacco industry should be made liable for the
harm caused by their products and labelled their products as a "killer".9 To
establish whether or not the tobacco manufacturers should be held liable
under the tort of negligence it is ﬁrst necessary to examine the legal rules on
causation.
Causation
Causation is the physical connection between what is perceived to be the
defendant's negligence and the claimant's damage. The claimant must prove
the damage was caused by the defendant's breach of duty and that it was not
too remote. The former part is referred to as causation in fact, while the
latter deals with causation in law. Causation in fact deals with cause and
effect; the methodology used by lawyers and the judiciary to determine the
issue, which is referred to as the "but for" test. The claimant must prove on
2
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2 Health Education Authority (14 January 2000) The Tobacco Industry and the Health Risks
of Smoking, a Memorandum by the Health Education Authority, Select Committee.
3 An organisation which sets standards in nursing.
4 Which was founded by the Royal College of Physicians in 1971 to preserve the health of
the community and educate the public on issues concerning smoking.
5 Action on Smoking and Health and The Royal College of Nursing (2 February 1999): The
Conduct of the Tobacco Industry, Select Committee on Health, Minutes of Evidence.
6 Although the author is aware of the 1987 legislation implemented to protect the consumer,
it is the intention to focus on the law of tort, i.e., the common law.
7 See R. Bradgate Commercial Law, 2nd ed., 2000, Butterworths 351.
8 Ibid., p. 351.
9 Op. cit. p. 1.
a balance of probabilities "but for" the defendant's behaviour the claimant
would not have suffered harm. However, if the loss would have occurred
regardless of the defendant's conduct, then in law the defendant is not the
primary cause of harm. For example, in the case of Barnett v. Chelsea and
Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428, which
involved a patient who complained of vomiting and stomach pains, the
patient was not examined, was sent away without any treatment and was told
to see his own doctor. He died ﬁve hours later from arsenic poisoning. Based
upon expert evidence presented, it was proven that the patient was beyond
help and would have died even if he had received treatment. Therefore, the
doctor's negligence was not the cause of death. Arguably, the usage of the
"but for" test relies heavily upon evidence presented and speculation by the
court to what might have happened if the defendant acted in a different way.
The House of Lords examined the criteria for causation again in the context
of an omission to act when dealing with "special skill" and the medical
profession in the case of Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Authority
[1997] 1 WLR 582. This case dealt with a young child who had been
suffering from respiratory problems and was under hospital observation.
Complications had occurred on two occasions and on both occasions the
Sister requested a Doctor attend. The Doctor failed to respond to both
requests and the child suffered a fatal third episode of respiratory problems,
causing a cardiac arrest and brain damage. Based upon the criteria for
causation it was necessary to prove if a Doctor had attended, before the last
episode, would or should she have intubated the child, which may have
prevented the physical harm? On the medical evidence presented, the court
found, on a balance of probabilities, that the Doctor would not have
intubated and this was supported by medical opinion. The onus of proving
causation is placed with the claimant who must demonstrate on a balance of
probabilities that the defendant's breach caused the damage. This may be an
impossible task for the claimant to prove, particularly in claims relating to
medical conditions, for example tobacco products.
The second limb to proving causation, causation in law, relates to remoteness
of damage; causation in fact has been established, but this will not
automatically prove the defendant is liable. There is a cut-off point where
the defendant will be deemed, in law, not to be liable and the damages
suffered are said to be "too remote". Arguably, this legal rule was established
to limit the overall extent of an alleged tortfeasor's liability to a claimant.
Therefore, even if the defendant's breach is a cause in fact resulting in the
claimant's damage, compensation will be denied if the damages are said to
be "too remote". It is this element which links with public policy, i.e., either
recognising or denying a duty of care and liability. The implications of a
judge's ruling when making a policy decision will either open the ﬂoodgates,
i.e., pave the way for additional claims, or restrict future claims in particular
areas of law. One such area is smoking related illnesses and the tobacco
manufacturers' responsibility. This was illustrated in the ﬁrst class action,
commenced by Martyn Day, against the tobacco manufacturers in Britain.
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Tobacco products and foreseeable risks
It was inevitable, given the scientiﬁc evidence, that a claim would be
brought against the tobacco industry in Britain. In 1992 Martyn Day, a
senior partner with Leigh, Day and Co. commenced a class action against
the British tobacco companies for personal injuries as a direct result of the
use of their products. An outline of this action is given in Mr Day's
Memorandum to the House of Commons Select Committee,10 where he
claimed the tobacco industry was aware of the risks, i.e., the level of tar
contained in a cigarette was the cause of lung cancer, yet chose to ignore
those risks which resulted in physical harm for the consumer. He based this
allegation on the following argument:
The available studies indicate that a reduction in the yield of smoke
condensate of a cigarette and a reduction in the amount that comes in
contact with the lung will be followed by a reduction of the risk of
lung cancer (p. 6)
Mr Day examined the earlier evidence carried out by Sir Richard Doll and
Sir Austin Bradford in 1950, which comprehensively documented the history
of the evidence of harm caused by the usage of tobacco and reported to the
House of Commons Select Committee that the rise in the number of deaths
from lung cancer linked to tobacco products increased between 1922
and 1947.11 Further, he claimed that deaths in Britain increased: ". . . 15-fold
from 612 to 9,287 per annum".12 He found that: ". . . the results from the
ﬁrst 20 years of the study, and other studies at the time, substantially
underestimated the hazards of long term use of tobacco: it now seems that
about half of all regular cigarette smokers will eventually be killed by their
habit".13
Claims such as these support a genuine cause of action against the
manufacturers of tobacco, yet, in Britain, it appears that social policy and the
funding of litigation have acted as a deterrent in bringing a successful claim
in negligence against the tobacco industry. The question of funding was
raised by Martyn Day in his Memorandum. One of the main barriers
discussed was legal aid.14 He believed that if it was not granted in such
cases this would result in a denial of justice.
Mr Day commenced an action against the tobacco industry on behalf of his
clients in a class action15 which involved 52 claimants suffering from
various diseases alleged to have been caused by smoking. Mr Day had
applied for legal aid to fund his clients' claim, which was initially granted
4
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11 Ibid., p. 2.
12 12 P. 2.
13 13 P. 2.
14 Following the Government's White Paper, Modernising Justice, the funding of legal
services (legal aid) has been taken over by the Legal Services Commission and a body
known as the Community Legal Service has been set up to take control over in the civil
legal aid sector. This was implemented through the Access to Justice Act 1999. Personal
injury cases are now dealt with on a conditional fee: no win, no fee.
15 John Barrie Hodgson & Ors v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd & Ors (1999) QB; see Lawtel
Transcript, case number C8600377, 9 February 1999.
for a short period of time but eventually withdrawn. To pursue any further
action the strongest cases were selected and proceeded on a conditional fee
scheme, i.e., no win, no fee.16 This allowed the claim to proceed against the
tobacco companies Imperial and Gallagher, commonly known as British
American Tobacco (BAT) and the case was set to be heard for late 1999/
2000. However, the claimants' action was further thwarted by a successful
application by BAT for an order to bar the claimants' action under the
Limitation Act 1980.
Two thirds of the claimants represented by Martyn Day were suffering from
lung cancer and had issued proceedings more than three years from
diagnosis. Many claims are now considered time barred, since no action may
be brought against a defendant for personal injuries after three years from
the accrual of the cause of injury. Mr Justice Wright, who had been allocated
the case, agreed with BAT's claim and refused to allow the claim to proceed.
This was commented on by Robins17 who claims an additional reason why
the claim was not successful was:
Mr Justice Wright singled out Leigh, Day & Co for criticism . . . The
ﬁrm had begun the action in 1992 when it placed advertisements
inviting people suffering from smoking-related illnesses to contact the
ﬁrm. The Judge claimed that the motivation from the plaintiffs was the
practice's 'advertised willingness' to take on the tobacco companies. The
reasons why the plaintiffs were out of time, the Judge continued, were
the 'product of the ingenuity' of the lawyers and not representative of
'either the reality or the instructions'. Such behaviour was to be
deprecated . . . (p. 9)
To compound matters the claimants' team of lawyers was given the option to
sign a personal undertaking not to pursue any future claims against the
tobacco industry, not to make reference to evidence which had been revealed
and not to campaign against the tobacco industry. In exchange for this
undertaking BAT would not pursue costs, amounting to £15 M against the
claimants. In response to this undertaking Mr Day stated in his
Memorandum: "Although these are extremely onerous undertakings, . . . I
felt that our absolute duty was to protect the Claimants and we, therefore,
signed them".18
The American approach
The American tobacco industry was facing the same allegations against their
products and the publicity was beginning to have an adverse effect. Casale
et al.19 claim that since the 1950s there have been over 1,800 lawsuits ﬁled
against the tobacco industry in the United States alleging personal injury
through the consumption of tobacco products. Such cases were not always
successful, due to the defence of consent, that is, the claimant (smoker) was
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16 The Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. Section 58 legitimised conditional fee
agreements. See also footnote 11.
17 J. Robins (1999) Out of Puff, Law Society Gazette, Vol. 96, p.9.
18 P.2.
19 G. Casale & R. N. Raval US Tobacco Litigation: a lot of smoke, but no ﬁre for the
insurance industry [1999] International Journal of Business Law 2-13.
aware of the risks associated with smoking but still consumed tobacco.
Juries have accepted this defence. As a result, the tobacco industry have
become known as the invincible "Big Tobacco".20
The ﬁrst action commenced in the United States was in 1954 by Eva
Cooper, who unsuccessfully ﬁled a wrongful death action against R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. for the death of her husband who had died from lung
cancer.21 One of the reasons why the case failed was, similarly to the British
case, ﬁnancial: personal funds could not provide the lawyers to face the
army of lawyers representing the tobacco industry. Thus, for the next two
decades, subsequent litigation was quickly quashed by the tobacco industry's
well-funded defence team.22
Legislation—a defence and absolution
Legislation was implemented in America to ensure the consumer would
eventually have knowledge of smoking associated risks. As far as the
tobacco industry were concerned, this would shift the onus of responsibility
onto the consumer and arguably act both as a defence and absolution for the
tobacco industry. In Britain, health warnings began to appear on
advertisements and cigarette packets by 1971.23 As in America this was
initiated by the Government and not the tobacco industry. Casale24 believes
this legislation, which purported to inform the consumer of the dangers of
smoking, gave the tobacco industry a successful defence against common
law claims, i.e., they made the consumer aware of the risks and voluntarily
put themselves at risk (volenti non ﬁt injuria).
Casale25 claims this defence continued to protect the tobacco industry until
1983 when a lawsuit was ﬁled and concluded in the case of Cipollone v.
Ligget Inc., 893 F2nd 541, 551 (5rd Cir.) (1990). This case concerned Rose
Cipollone (the claimant) who had smoked approximately one to two packets
of cigarettes a day between 1942 to the very early 1980s.26 Ms Cipollone
was diagnosed with lung cancer in 1981 but was unable to give up smoking,
even when she had a lung removed. In 1984 she died. However, before her
death she had issued a product liability lawsuit against Ligget, Philip Morris
and Lorillard for suffering and claimed monetary damages relating to her
lung cancer.27 In 1988 Ms Cipollone's estate was awarded $400,000. The
court found that the tobacco industry had made an express warranty that its
products were safe in the years before any warnings were legally required
for tobacco products. This was the ﬁrst monetary award made against a
tobacco company. However, the award was appealed and in 1992 it was
overturned by the Supreme Court. Apart from wearing the claimant's estate
down, the tobacco industry had successfully relied upon the legal defence of
6
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21 C. Molenkamp et al. The People vs. Big Tobacco: How the States Took On the Cigarette
Giants: Bloomberg Press, 1998, at 250.
22 See Casale, n. 19 at 4.
23 Health Education Authority, 14 January 2000, 3; see footnote 2.
24 Op. cit., 4
25 Ibid. 5.
26 893 F 2d 541, 551.
27 Casale, 5.
contributory negligence.28 The claimant's estate was unable to fund any
further action against the tobacco industry. Arguably, the tobacco industry
had the ﬁnancial ability to exhaust the claimant's (estate) funds and defeat
the claim, again.
Although the 1992 Supreme Court did not support the award made to Ms
Cipollone's estate, there has been more recent litigation against the tobacco
industry. The disclosure of conﬁdential documents and supporting evidence
by "whistleblowers," i.e., employees who reveal inside information,
demonstrated that although the tobacco industry was aware of the health
risks associated with its products, it still manipulated the levels of nicotine to
enhance addiction.29 This has led to a massive attack on the tobacco industry
in America. Since 1997 class actions worth billions of dollars have been
initiated.
Smoking kills
In Britain, the current Government has published a White Paper: "Smoking
Kills"30 which highlights the dangers related to smoking. It appears to be
aware of the health risks associated with cigarette smoking, particularly the
high rates of death related to smoking in comparison to other European
countries. The White Paper states that: "Women under 65 in the UK have the
worst death rate from lung cancer of all EU countries except
Denmark",31and further that:
Smoking is the single greatest cause of preventable illness and
premature death in the UK. Smoking kills over 120,000 people in the
UK a year—more than 13 people an hour. Every hour, every day. For
the EU as a whole the number of deaths from tobacco is estimated at
well over 500,000 a year. A generation after the health risks from
smoking were demonstrated beyond dispute, smoking is still causing
misery to millions. Smoking is still killing. (1.1)
This begs the question of whether any party is prepared to accept moral
responsibility for so many deaths.
The issue of moral responsibility
The claims made by RCN and ASH, above, that the tobacco industry has
had scientiﬁc knowledge of the dangers associated with smoking for the past
ﬁfty years, yet chose to ignore it, is supported by the HEA. They claim the
American company Brown and Williamson, a subsidiary of British American
Tobacco, had scientiﬁc knowledge many years ahead of the general scientiﬁc
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community, which gave speciﬁc details relating to the impact of smoking on
humans. HEA further claim:
Although the Brown & Williamson documents provided an insight to
one company, it is clear from other documents ﬁled in the Minnesota
litigation that the level and depth of knowledge held by this one
company was relatively common throughout the industry (p. 3).
The HEA in their Executive Summary to the House of Commons Select
Committee outlined the research carried out which linked smoking with lung
cancer and other illnesses which begins in 1950 with the aforementioned
Doll and Bradford-Hill paper. This was followed by the American Cancer
Society Nine State Study in 1952; the US Veterans Study in 1954; the
Canadian Veterans Study in 1955; the American Cancer Society Twenty Five
States Study in 1959/1960; and The Royal College of Physicians' Report
"Smoking and Health,'' in 1962. The Surgeon-General's and the US
Department of Health and Human Services' reports throughout this period
came to a similar conclusion, namely, that smoking is causally related to
lung cancer and other ailments and is a leading contributory cause of death.
The Memorandum summarises the research:
. . . the harmful effect of smoking is, in the Department of Health's
view, incontrovertible. Convincing evidence that smoking is extremely
harmful emerged in the 1950s and has been widely available since
the 1960s. Smoking is the single greatest cause of preventable illness
and premature death in the UK and kills over 120,000 people in the
UK a year. Smoking causes over a third of all cancer deaths in the UK,
amounting to 46,500 deaths a year. In the UK in 1995, 84 per cent of
all (male and female) lung cancer deaths were caused by smoking. One
out of ﬁve male and one out of 10 female deaths from circulatory heart
diseases were caused by smoking. In 1995 this was estimated to be a
total of 40,300 circulatory disease deaths. Cigarette smoking caused a
third of all circulatory deaths under age 65. (p. 4)
Given the amount of research undertaken which demonstrates the link
between tobacco products and health issues, inferences arise which justify a
conclusion, in the absence of an explanation, that the tobacco industry has
been negligent. Further, in view of this knowledge, and with reference to the
work of Doll and Bradford-Hill, the HEA argues:
Any manufacturer of any product which is dangerous to health has a
responsibility to warn those who may be affected by that product. The
principle of responsibility in common law negligence ('the duty of
care') was established in the House of Lords in 1932, in the Matter of
Donoghue v. Stevenson. Thus tobacco companies had a moral and legal
responsibility to warn consumers and others who would be affected of
the dangers of smoking. (p. 3)
However, as the HEA claim: "The tobacco industry has never voluntarily
warned its customers about the dangers of smoking, and only recently has
done so in the United States, having been coerced by the threat of legal
8
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action from the States' Attorneys General".32 Thus, from the evidence
presented it would be fair to say tobacco products cause cancer and are
dangerous. However, if a product is bad it is either withdrawn from the
market or made safe. The current Government is not proposing either of
these options in their White Paper. Therefore, it would appear the tobacco
industry and the Government can be held jointly responsible for the number
of deaths caused by smoking. However, it may be argued that, in view of the
health warnings and adverse publicity surrounding the smoking of tobacco
products, consumers are now in a position to shoulder some responsibility
themselves.
Nicotine—a highly addictive drug
In March 1998 a UK Government Scientiﬁc Committee stated:
Over the past decade there has been increasing recognition that
underlying smoking behaviour and its remarkable intractability to
change is addiction to the drug nicotine. Nicotine has been shown to
have effects on the brain dopamine systems similar to those of drugs
such as heroin and cocaine.33
If this claim is correct, is the consumer making an informed choice?
According to the HEA34 a third of smokers were not aware that the main
cancer causing substance in cigarettes is tar, and not nicotine, adding insult
to injury. They concluded their Memorandum to the House of Commons
Select Committee by stating:
Cigarettes are by far the most dangerous consumer product on the
market. It is shocking that consumers have less information about
cigarettes than they have about any other product. Government should
require tobacco companies to give more accurate and more appropriate
information about products to consumers. (p. 9)
The Government are not proposing to reduce the risk or remove the product
from the market, rather they intend to spend public money to help
individuals stop smoking. Removing the product from the market would
seem the most radical solution to the problem. However, as nicotine is
highly addictive, both physically and psychologically, any attempt to remove
cigarettes with no ready substitution, nor comprehensive contingency plan,
might possibly have serious implications and repercussions. However, to
allow tobacco companies to carry on producing products which will not only
induce addiction but will increase such a condition may be seen as socially
irresponsible. This needs to be addressed and the Government's White Paper,
while addressing the problems of individual smokers, does not appear to be
dealing with the manufacturers.
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34 Op. cit., 9.
The Government's proposals35 are to increase public awareness of the
dangers of smoking whilst recognising the individual's right of choice, and
for the smoker to take individual responsibility for themselves. The White
Paper is quite clear: non-intervention, persuasion through education,
advertising and the offer of help for those addicted are believed to be the
right way to approach the problem.
Nicotine: an uncontrolled drug
The current Government recognises that action in areas of personal choice is
a difﬁcult and sensitive issue. If introduced today, tobacco, a uniquely
dangerous product, would not stand a chance of being legal. However, as the
White Paper states: "smoking is not against the law. We do not intend to
make smoking unlawful".36
If nicotine were to be treated as a drug, based upon the chemical effects it
has upon the brain and body, then as with most drugs there is a risk of side
effects, some of which may be harmful in themselves. When deciding the
safety issue a balance is drawn between the risk of harm from the drug and
the risk of the illness. With regard to tobacco the risks are well documented
and the public are now informed through publicity and advertisements.
Nicotine addiction: the American approach
In the United States the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible
for ensuring that food is ﬁt for human consumption, that medical devices
and cosmetics are safe to use, and for regulating drugs. The FDA derives its
authority from the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 301 et
seq. which allows control over products which are inhaled, ingested,
implanted or otherwise used in close contact with the consumer. It is this
jurisdiction that led to the FDA asserting they had legitimate power to
control the consumption of cigarette and tobacco products. They supported
this argument by stating:
Cigarettes . . . deliver a pharmacologically active dose of nicotine to
the body through inhalation, and smoking tobacco, which delivers a
pharmacologically active dose of nicotine . . . deliver [ing] a
pharmacologically active substance to the bloodstream . . . no products
cause more death and disease than cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.37
(p. 1)
Thus, the FDA believed they had the right to regulate cigarettes. To prove
this, the then Chairman of FDA, David Kessler, began to investigate the
tobacco industry. In 1994 he received information which revealed that the
10
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36 1.25.
37 Food and Drug Administration (August 1996) Executive Summary: Nicotine in Cigarettes
and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products are Nicotine Delivery Devices
Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act: http://www.fda/gov/opacom/campaign/
tobaco/ execsum
tobacco manufacturer Brown & Williamson had created a tobacco plant with
an extremely high level of nicotine. According to Mollenkamp38 the tobacco
industry were:
. . . creating the breed to be able to mix it with tobacco that had lower
levels of tar. In other words, Brown & Williamson was attempting to
maintain or increase the level of nicotine in cigarettes even as it
lowered the amount of tar. (p. 111)
On the 21 March 2000, before the Supreme Court of the United States the
case of Food and Drug Administration, et al., Petitioners v. Brown and
Williamson Tobacco Corporation et al. was heard and Justice O'Connor
stated:
In this case, we believe that Congress has clearly precluded the FDA
from asserting jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. Such
authority is inconsistent with the intent that Congress has expressed
in the FDCA's overall regulatory scheme and in the tobacco speciﬁc
legislation that it has enacted subsequent to the FDCA. In light of
this clear intent, the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction is
impermissible.39
Justice O'Connor explained that to allow FDA to regulate tobacco would
cause a number of inconsistencies; for example, the FDCA required the FDA
to determine a regulated product as "safe" before it may be sold or allowed
to remain on the market.40 The Act requires the FDA to prevent the
marketing of any drug or device where the "potential of inﬂicting death or
physical injury is not off-set by the possibility of therapeutic beneﬁt.''41
Thus, the FDA would have to ban tobacco products, a remedy the court
found to be unacceptable and would be contrary to Congressional intent. The
court believed that Congress did not intend to give the FDA the authority to
regulate tobacco when they enacted the FDCA.
In light of this ruling the FDA will not regulate nicotine as an addictive
drug. The Supreme Court has clearly placed responsibility with Congress
and it is Congress which must now demonstrate that they have dealt with
any foreseeable problems. However, Congress' responsibility to protect the
consumer from dangerous products must be viewed in light of the Multistate
Master Settlement Agreement of November 23, 1998.
Counting the cost
Read42 suggests that the implications of dealing with the direct causes of
nicotine addiction would have economic consequences which would have a
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Avebury.
direct effect on the revenue the Government receives from the sale of
cigarettes. He claims that:
Cigarettes provide governments with one of their biggest and most
valuable sources of revenue. They support thousands of jobs, both
directly and indirectly, particularly crucial in times of economic
recession. In 1991, total revenue yield to the British government from
excise duties was £21,143 million; tobacco products contributed £5,636
million, an increase of 2.1 per cent on the previous ﬁnancial year. (p. 3)
This relationship between the Government and the tobacco industry is
evidence that there is a conﬂict of interest in providing the consumer with a
safe product and making money for both parties, the Government and the
tobacco industry. Read claims this relationship is due to the fact that: " . . .
tobacco manufacturers remain securely attached to a product which is cheap
to make and highly proﬁtable. Being addictive, it is also easy to sell and, as
such, much less affected by economic trends amongst consumers".43 The
economic factors form a strong link between the Government and the
tobacco industry. If the Government were to penalise the tobacco
manufacturers by introducing legislation, the reduction in proﬁts would result
in a domino effect within the economy. For example, Read believes that
strong productivity and sales allow suppliers to increase employment and
suggests that: "83,500 people (0.3 per cent of the work force) are employed
full-time as a direct consequence . . . by the tobacco industry".44 Arguably,
this produces a dilemma for the Government in a choice between support for
a possible decline in the tobacco industry and the health of the nation.
It is against this background that one can see and explain the development
of policies concerning smoking emerging and one is provided with some
understanding as to why successive Governments have not taken direct
action against the tobacco industry. Troyer and Markle45 claim that the
controversial issue surrounding health and smoking is: " . . . not an isolated
phenomenon, but a series of interconnected events, behaviour and action
shaped by political, economic and social forces'".46
The cost related factors in Britain
The cost of smoking for the National Health Service (NHS) is estimated to
be £1.7 billion every year.47 The current Government intends to address this
problem by attempting to reduce tobacco smoking but in the meantime the
present system is paid for by the taxpayer. The NHS is paid for by the
taxpayer48 regardless of whether or not the victim of a tort, such as one who
has suffered personal injuries, is able to successfully recover compensation.
It is not only the cost to the NHS but also to agencies such as Social
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Services which provide support and care for those suffering from smoking
related illnesses.
The conﬂict of interest between health care and raising revenue is self-
evident. The present system lacks integrity, allowing the tobacco industry to
continue to produce a product which results in smoking related illnesses.
These illnesses are treated by an organisation, the NHS, which is dependent
on the public purse, which is ﬁlled by raising revenue from those that make
the product, consume the product and non-smokers. To allow such a system
to operate is tantamount to negligence on behalf of the Government. Thus,
the question that needs to be addressed is: how should the NHS claim back
the cost for treating smoking related illnesses?
Counting the cost in the United States—
The Multistate Master Settlement
Agreement
The Multistate Master Settlement Agreement (MMSA) involved the tobacco
industry reimbursing States for its health care expenditure for ailments
related to smoking tobacco. The producers participating in the settlement are
Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco (a subsidiary of RJR Nabisco
Holdings), Lorillard Tobacco (a subsidiary of the Loews Companies) and
Brown & Williamson Tobaccos (a subsidiary of British American Tobacco).
Initially, the Settlement was to be given the force of law by Congress.
However, negotiations broke down on the 8th April 1998 and the process
failed. However, the tobacco industry, aware of the claims, continued to
negotiate with individual States resulting in settlements. For example, on the
2 July 1997 a settlement was made with Mississippi: this state was to
receive $3.3 billion dollars over 25 years, with annual payments of at least
$134 million. Florida settled their claim on the 16 January 1998 for $14.5
billion over 25 years, resulting in annual payments of $580 million. The
most far reaching settlement was made with Minnesota on the 8 May 1998
for $6.5 billion. Further settlement resulted in another 46 States accepting
$206 billion,49 which will be paid over 25 years, to compensate each State
for medical costs related to smoking tobacco. The agreement did not need
the approval of Congress and was structured to bring an end to pending and
future lawsuits.
Individual claims outside the MMSA
The MMSA has attempted to settle State claims, compensate the health
system and restrict advertising. However, this has not prevented litigation in
the form of either class actions or individual claims against the tobacco
industry. Such claims, which were previously unsuccessful, are now
succeeding. For example, a Los Angeles' complainant, Lesley Whitely, who
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was diagnosed with lung cancer and had started smoking after the Surgeon
General's warning notice began to appear on cigarette packets in the 1960s,
was recently awarded $20 M (£12.6 M) in punitive damages from Philip
Morris and R.J. Reynolds, two of the largest tobacco companies in
America.50 The award was made because the companies had designed their
cigarettes in a negligent manner and made misleading (false) statements to
the public. The punitive damages were made in addition to $1.7 M to
compensate the claimant for medical care and loss of earnings, and to
compensate the complainant's husband for loss of companionship.
Conclusion
Asking who is to blame for the deaths of 120,000 people a year in Britain
from illnesses directly related to smoking yields the answer is the tobacco
industry, the Government and the consumer. However, as when dealing with
the issue of law, health, moral responsibility, freedom of choice and
economic consequences, it becomes apparent that the blame could be
apportioned in varying degrees to any or all three depending on the issue.
People continued to smoke even though in the 1950s scientiﬁc evidence
revealed that smoking tobacco was dangerous. Also, the tobacco industry
was aware of the scientiﬁc evidence but was also aware that nicotine was
highly addictive and "the cigarette pack . . . [was] a storage container for a
day's supply of nicotine". Yet, while denying that nicotine was addictive, it
increased dependency on its product through the use of additives which
increased the speed at which nicotine was transported to the brain.
In Britain, the tobacco industry owed a duty of care to the consumer under
the law of tort. This duty of care was established through the case of
Donoghue v. Stevenson in which Lord Atkin enunciated: "you must take
reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee
would be likely to injure your neighbour". The RCN and ASH claim that by
the 1950s the link between smoking and serious illness and premature death
was "established beyond reasonable doubt". The degree of risks involved
with smoking tobacco products was foreseeable at the time when scientiﬁc
knowledge was not only made available but made known to the tobacco
industry. Thus, they breached the duty of care and as a result of that breach
the consumer suffered harm or even death. Subsequently it may be said that
in not preventing harm, it caused the harm. Until public policy dictates
otherwise, the courts will continue to use mental gymnastics to exclude
causation in law, whilst documentary evidence demonstrates causation in
fact. Unless the legal position changes the tobacco industry will continue to
be legally blameless, while the consumer continues to die for a cigarette.
Even now, no claim against the tobacco industry has been successful in
Britain due to legal technicalities, such as causation in law, being time
barred under the Limitation Act 1980 and the ﬁnancial considerations
involved in funding such a claim.
The tobacco industries in the United States have faced similar allegations
under the law of tort for causing personal injury or death and have, until
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recently, successfully defended such allegations in court. However, class
actions brought by claimants who suffer from smoking-related illnesses have
not only been successful but have resulted in millions of dollars being
awarded in punitive damages. This reﬂects not only the feelings and attitudes
of juries but also the recognition of such claims.
It would seem that the reason why the tobacco industry has not made
recompense to the National Health Service for the costs incurred through
smoking-related illnesses is due to an economic situation in which,
"cigarettes provide Governments with one of their biggest and most valuable
sources of revenue". In 1991, as we have seen, excise duties amounted to
£21,143 million, whereas the cost of smoking for the NHS is estimated to be
£1.7 billion every year. Thus, there appears to be a conﬂict of interest in
providing the consumer with a safe product and generating income for both
the Government and the tobacco industry, which ostensibly places the blame
for smoking related deaths on both equally.
The provisions of the MMSA attempt to acknowledge and address the
problems associated with tobacco products. Not only does the MMSA
attempt to control the sale and promotion of such products but it has
compensated the medical system for the cost of treatment due to smoking-
related ailments. Arguably this has not only raised awareness of the dangers
associated with smoking tobacco products but has sent a message to the
tobacco industry: that its product is defective and it is to blame. The tobacco
companies involved in the settlement have accepted this responsibility by
paying vast amounts of compensation to individual States in full and ﬁnal
settlement.
Smoking while knowing the dangers involved appears to be an individual
decision which should be respected. While personal choice should be
acknowledged and individuals' needs met, consumers should be fully
informed of the dangers of smoking tobacco products. Smoking tobacco, a
substance which is highly addictive, may lead to physical ailments and the
likelihood that the consumer may end up dying for a cigarette.
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